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BOOK REVIEW 
Legislative History is Dead; 
Long Live Legislative History
Misreading Law, Misreading Democracy
Victoria Nourse (Harvard University Press 2016), 259 pages
Genevieve B. Tung, rev’r*
Misreading Law, Misreading Democracy is a call to rethink everything
that most lawyers, judges, and academics think we know about legislative
history. Even the term “legislative history,” Nourse argues, should be
treated as a misnomer;1 we should instead seek out evidence of legislative
decisionmaking. The book explains several reasons for this shift;
prominent among these is that the search for “history” implies the
existence of a single story, “as if the final text reflected a straight narrative
line from the first draft.”2 The actual process of American lawmaking is
dominated by recursive combat and compromise.
Before becoming a law professor, Victoria Nourse served as counsel to
the Senate Iran Contra Committee and later became senior advisor to
Senator Joe Biden during his time as chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee.3 Professor Nourse’s service to Congress is reflected by her
work, both in her detailed knowledge of legislative procedure and by the
respect with which she treats her subject. Respect, she argues, is an
essential part of statutory interpretation: if we treat the authors of legis-
lation with disdain, we undermine the representative foundations of our
democracy.
* Associate Director, Rutgers Law Library. 
1 VICTORIA NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, MISREADING DEMOCRACY 79–80 (2016).
2 Id. at 157.
3 See Victoria Nourse, GEORGETOWN LAW, https://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/victoria-nourse/ (last visited June 6,
2018). Professor Nourse later spent a year working as then–Vice President Biden’s Chief Counsel before returning to
academia. NOURSE, supra note 1, at 247–48.
What is needed, she argues, is for anyone in the business of statutory
interpretation to become well-versed in Congress’s rules, mores, and
motivations. The topic is neglected in many law schools. A realist under-
standing of how Congress operates should demystify how statutory
language comes into being and make the documentation of that statute’s
legislative journey intelligible. When lawyers can correctly isolate and
interpret the meaningful pieces of a legislative record, we can use them for
statutory interpretation. We cannot determine what materials are mean-
ingful, or interpret them accurately, without considering when they occur
in the sequence of lawmaking, the audience to which they are addressed,
and the status of the author—qualities that are determined by Congress’s
rules. 
To begin, Nourse explains that we must appreciate that legislative
action is determined by two inescapable realities: legislators’ need to
satisfy their constituents (the “electoral connection”) and the requirement
of broad-based consensus to actually accomplish anything (the “superma-
joritarian difficulty”). Armed with this knowledge, we can view the
process of lawmaking from the perspective of the lawmaker, as opposed to
the ex post view more commonly taken in law schools and the courts.
These structural factors explain why so much legislation is ambiguous,
and why a theory of statutory interpretation must be prepared to deal with
ambiguity as a feature instead of a bug.
Familiarity with Congress’s rules is also critical to Nourse’s “legislative
decision theory” of statutory interpretation, which responds to flaws she
identifies in both textualist, purposivist, and contract theory approaches.
Legislative decision theory is predicated on understanding “Congress 101,”
five basic principles of congressional procedure that inform how legis-
lation develops:
1. “Statutes are Elections” with winners and losers. Before relying
on a congressional committee report or member statement to
interpret a statute, courts should know if it was generated by
the proponents or opponents of the underlying legislation. The
best type of such “legislative evidence” are documents that
demonstrate bipartisan agreement on core principles.
2. “Statutes Follow a Sequence,” and must be “reverse-engineered”
in order to determine what legislative evidence is relevant.
3. “Congress’s Rules Can Help Interpret Statutes,” and these rules
can be used as “legislative canons” to solve interpretive puzzles.
4. “Typologies of Legislative History May Mislead,” such that
traditional hierarchies of legislative material can be worse than
useless; no single “type” of document will always be the most
reliable evidence of a legislative decision, and focusing on type
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without contextual considerations can lead to inefficient,
fruitless, or misleading analysis.
5. “What is Unthinkable to a Judge May Be Quite Thinkable to a
Member of Congress,” meaning that the congressional rules
that govern cloture, reconciliation, or appropriations bills may
shape legislators’ decisions in logical and predictable ways, and
courts should be cognizant of these rules and their effects.4
Nourse elaborates on each of these foundational principles in Chapter
3, illustrating the importance of each with examples of judicial opinions
that seriously misunderstood or misapplied legislative material in search
of statutory meaning. In United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, for
example, Justice Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion included a voluminous
legislative history of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 5 Rehnquist’s dissent,
Nourse points out, has been praised by some liberal scholars for
embracing legislative history in lieu of textualism.6 But the congressional
text Rehnquist relied on, notably a House committee report, was created
before the relevant language was incorporated into the legislation, and was
a minority report drafted by opponents of the larger bill.7 As such, she
argues, Rehnquist’s narrative “reflects a flawed understanding of legislative
process” because it conflates earlier, superseded text with final text, and
“risks normative bias against majorities” by allowing the views of bill
opponents to speak with equal or greater authority to those of the bill’s
proponents.8
In Chapter 4, Nourse argues that methods of statutory interpretation
that pointedly avoid looking to legislative material, such as “petty
textualism” (isolating a disputed term from its surrounding text) and
reliance on judicial canons, are inferior both as a practical matter and
because they elevate judicial authority over legislative authority.9 Such
“canon textualism,” she argues, is anti-democratic because it allows judges
to impose their views (about what constitutes “plain meaning,” or which
canons to apply), often in ways that may be shaped by unconscious bias.10
For example, statutory interpreters may be vulnerable to the “focusing
illusion,” in which a person’s focus on a particular aspect of a situation (or,
4 See id. at 68–69.
5 443 U.S. 193, 219–55 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., with Burger, C.J., dissenting).
6 NOURSE, supra note 1, at 74 (citing Philip P. Frickey, Wisdom on Weber, 74 TULANE L. REV. 1169, 1183, 1195 (2000)).
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 See id. at 103–06.
10 See id. at 116.
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say, a particular phrase in a statute) leads her to overvalue that aspect and
undervalue the context in which it arises, which may lead to snap
judgments based on inadequate information.11 Understanding the rules
that bind congressional action, and taking the time to read legislative
documentation, are both methods that interpreters may use to mitigate
their cognitive biases.
By focusing entirely on the timing and significance of legislative
materials within their congressional context, Nourse’s inquiry steers away
from the search for “legislative intent” and looks instead for evidence of
legislative decisions.12 Chapter 5 is entirely devoted to dismantling
notions, offered by scholars Max Radin, Ronald Dworkin, Jeremy
Waldron, Kenneth Shepsle, and others that a legislature cannot act with
“intent” because it is a collective body without a single mind.13 This skep-
ticism, she argues, is irrelevant: the question “is not whether Congress has
a mind but how it decides and what it means by its decision.”14 Nourse
argues for a pragmatic view of intent inferred from action.15 Again,
Congress’s rules of proceeding are critical because they provide the
necessary context to interpret congressional action as a manifestation of
pragmatic intent.16 As Nourse has previously explained, the idea of
congressional intent is a metaphor,17 and the metaphor does not work
without the referent of legislative context.18
Reading as a researcher who is accustomed to spending time iden-
tifying and gathering legislative histories, Nourse’s view is powerful and
affirming, and her recommendations instantly useful. In Chapter 3, she
provides step-by-step instructions for “reverse engineering” a statute to
identify the most relevant legislative evidence, guiding the reader to seek
out last-in-time documentation of bipartisan agreement on statutory
meaning.19 As the book repeatedly points out, databases like ProQuest
Congressional and websites like Congress.gov (not to mention search
engines like Google) make the once-laborious process of finding these
11 See id. at 118–19. The focusing illusion was first identified by Prof. Daniel Kahneman, who addressed its impact on deci-
sionmaking in his recent best-seller, Thinking Fast and Slow. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 85–88
(2011).
12 NOURSE, supra note 1, 68.
13 See id. at 137–38.
14 Id. at 135–36. 
15 Id. at 142–44.
16 Id. at 149.
17 See Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 82–83 (2012). 
18 NOURSE, supra note 1, at 147.
19 See id. at 80.
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texts simple. By encouraging the reader to seek out statements made at the
most significant moments in the lawmaking sequence, such as cloture, the
book also provides a method for streamlining legislative research. As
Nourse points out, Justice Rehnquist’s lengthy Weber dissent could have
been stronger and shorter had he “reverse-engineered” the text.20 Given
how voluminous legislative materials can be, this is no small matter. The
time saved on assembling minutely detailed, potentially irrelevant
documents can be better spent reading the most relevant statements with
a careful view to the procedural posture of the legislation and the identity
of the speaker—is it from a “winner” or a “loser” of the ultimate political
combat?
Misreading Law, Misreading Democracy was published several weeks
before the 2016 elections that brought the Republican party into control of
the presidency and both houses of Congress. The vitriol of our current
political climate does not factor into Nourse’s conclusion; congressional
actions are entitled to respect by virtue of their representative privilege,
not their wisdom. In other words, “even if one has contempt for Congress,
a judge cannot have contempt for the real authors of legislation, the
people.”21 To proceed otherwise would allow judges to break faith with
democracy.
But what do we do with these principles if Congress “breaks faith” or
alters its practices in ways that undermine the predictability or trans-
parency of its actions? The 115th Congress has been criticized for drafting
important bills “in secret” and in the face of significant public disap-
proval.22 Does documentation of such decisionmaking, to the extent it is
truly preserved, truly amount to evidence of popular will? How should we
use unofficial, journalistic accounts of private dealmaking that may be
instrumental to a bill’s passage?23 Nourse reassures the reader that most
legislation is passed by large bipartisan coalitions, which is evidence of the
stability created by institutional rules that favor supermajorities. 24 This
20 See id. at 83. For example, Justice Rehnquist spends significant time analyzing draft language and House debates that
predate the addition of the key textual provision at issue, and Senate debates prior to cloture—information that is “true but
unhelpful.” Id. at 82–83. “Justice Rehnquist’s account of the legislative history is at its most persuasive when he cites
statements occurring at the proper moment in the sequence: post-cloture statements against quotas, made by supporters and
opponents of the bill.” Id. at 83.
21 Id. at 185–86.
22 See, e.g., Thomas Kaplan & Robert Pear, Senate Democrats Plan Showdown to Protest Secrecy over Health Law Repeal, N.Y.
TIMES, June 20, 2017, at A16.
23 See, e.g., Mike DuBonis & Erica Werner, How Republicans Overcame Outside Threats and Internal Strife, WASH. POST,
Dec. 21, 2017, at A1.
24 NOURSE, supra note 1, at 73 (“Congress 101 tells us that ‘normal lawmaking’ depends upon the filibuster; bills don’t pass
by 51 votes; they pass by overwhelming supermajorities precisely because of the filibuster.”).
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IS DEAD; LONG LIVE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 315
leaves the reader unsure of how to interpret legislation passed in highly
partisan circumstances under majoritarian exceptions.25
Misreading Law, Misreading Democracy is at its most compelling
when it draws the reader away from his or her own “electoral connection”
to the frustrations of politics, and refocuses attention on what Congress
symbolizes as a co-equal branch of government. It effectively demon-
strates that understanding congressional procedure is essential to
statutory interpretation and should be elevated within the law-school
curriculum. Even if the reader isn’t ready to give Congress high marks of
approval, Nourse’s work makes the case for understanding how Congress
works. 
25 Consider Acts like the major tax bill passed in the final days of 2017 without any bipartisanship to speak of. H.R. 1, the
“Tax Cuts and Jobs Act” of 2017, passed under majoritarian rules (51/49) without any Democratic votes in the Senate. See
Vote Summary on Passage of H.R. 1, U.S. SENATE (Dec. 2, 2017), https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/
roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=115&session=1&vote=00303. The result was similar in the House. See Final Vote Results for
Roll Call 699, OFFICE OF THE CLERK, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2017/roll699.xml; see
also DuBonis & Werner, supra note 23, at A1 (“The decision to spurn Democrats underscores the political risks undertaken
by the GOP, which pushed forward on the tax bill despite polls showing that it is one of the most unpopular pieces of legis-
lation in recent history . . . .”).
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